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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-------. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case Ho. 
-vs- UtH~; • t~-, 
DON C. COFFEY, 
Defendant-Appellant. -': \• •. ~flfJc&ae, 
- - - - - - - - - .: - - - - 11: t~!J'l 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPOJIDBWI~ A~ 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE. CASE 
t., .. _. "; ~ 11• fi;:"'t" 
Defendant appeals from a convi~tion of iS911iJaf a 
"'."\ 'I l•\ 
bad check in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-SOS (lhlrpp~ . 
'I J 1'-1 ··~ clrfte ' .. 
1975). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant was tried before a jury which.,~ .. '·~·· 
· .. ''.) . '··/ ' 
a verdict of guilty. The Honorable Allen B. Soreaaen 
,. ~ <'l 
entered judgment on that verdict, and sentenced defendant; 
to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirm-
ing the judgment rendered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Deputy County Attorney Gary Stott presented a 
stipulation that if Dorothy Gardner, an officer of the 
Dixie State Bank, were called to testify,her testimony 
would be that on July 29, 1975, and continuing to the 
date of trial, May 24, 1976, there were not sufficient 
funds in the defendant 1s checking account to clear a 
check of $3,560.00. Mr. Mulliner, the public defender, 
asked that the stipulation be modified so as to state that 
the insufficiency of funds would only be established for 
July 29, 1975, the date on the check in question (Tr,6). 
The State called Morris Ercanbrack to testify. He stated 
he was a fruit dealer who had sold a load of cherries to 
the defendant, and that the defendant had paid for the 
cherries with a check in the amount of $3,560.00. Morris 
Ercanbrack further testified that the defendant represented 
the check as good when it was written (Tr.9,12), that the 
check was put on collection for nearly one month, and that 
the only payment he had received on the check was $1,800.00 
from a third party approximately ten months after the 
transaction and after criminal proceedings had begun 
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(Tr.10). The public defender cross-examined the witness, 
asking if the defendant had not asked that the check be 
held for awhile in order to clear (Tr.12). The witness 
answered that the defendant represented that the check 
was good when presented. 
Randall Ercanbrack testified next for the 
State. Randall's testimony corroborated the fact that 
the defendant had represented the check was good when it 
was presented (Tr.15). At the close of the State's case, 
the public defender moved to dismiss the case for 
insufficiency of the evidence as to the defendant's 
criminal intent (Tr.17). The court denied the motion 
proforma (Tr.18). The public defender then asked for 
a recess to confer with the defendant, and after the 
recess declined to present any evidence (Tr.19). The 
public defender took exceptions to jury instruction 
Nos. 5 and 6 (Tr.20,R.25,26). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
Respondent agrees with the statement of the 
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law contained in appellantts brief that a claim of 
incompetence of counsel does not entitle a convicted 
felon to a reversal on appeal unless an extreme case 
is shown, where the trial was reduced to a farce or 
.sham. Appellant's claim for relief appears to be 
principally based on People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 
34 Cal.Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963), which he cites 
as authority for the proposition that an attorney's 
lack of preparation, which results in the denial to 
the defendant of a crucial defense, is a reversible 
flaw. In the Ibarra case, the defendant was charged 
with possession of heroin. The trial court asked the 
defense· counsel if he wished to make a motion to 
suppress a capsule of heroin offered as evidence by 
the state. Defense counsel declined because his 
client denied possession of the capsule and could not 
therefore object to the manner in which the police 
obtained it. The reason articulated by counsel for 
refusing to object to the evidence demonstrated an 
inexcusable ignorance of the law in California that 
a criminal defendant could object to the admission of 
narcotic evidence even if he claimed no proprietary 
-4-
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interest therein. The California Supreme Court held 
that the counsel's ignorance of the law, shown on the 
face of the record, which denied the defendant a 
crucial defense, entitled defendant to a new trial. 
The Ibarra case is distinguishable in several 
important respects. As the California Court later 
explained in In Re Saunders, 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1042, 88 
Cal.Rptr. 633, 639, 472 P. 2d 921, 927, fn •. 7 (1970): 
"Cases involving a failure to 
make those careful factual and legal 
inquiries and investigations necessary 
to a constitutionally adequate defense 
are to be distinguished, of course, 
from cases wherein counsel, having made 
such inquiries and investigations, makes 
tactical or strategic decisions--
whether wise or unwise when viewed with 
the benefit of hindsight--which cause him 
not to utilize the fruits of his labors." 
(Emphasis in original.) 
The principle defense urged by the public defender was 
that the State had produced insufficient evidence of criminal 
intent as required under the present Utah statute. Appel-
lant's new counsel urges that the defense should have been 
made by allowing appellant to "tell his story" which would 
establish his lack of criminal intent. Appellant's new 
counsel is not urging that the wrong defense was asserted, 
or that a crucial defense was withdrawn, but that the 
-5-
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defense was not presented in the proper way. The public 
defender was clearly awe.re of the defense urged by present 
counsel (Tr.12,ln.14,Tr.16,ln.3), and nothing in the 
record demonstrates that he was unprepared to present it. 
The central point of the defense urged by 
present counsel is that the appellant had told Mr. 
Ercanbrack to hold the check for a certain time until 
appellant could arrange his affairs so that the check, 
when deposited, would clear. The evidence produced by 
the State directly contradicted this point, and the 
public defender might well have thought, as a matter of 
tactics, that any testimony he could produce to the 
contrary would not help appellant as much as a cross-
examination by the State would hurt him. The thrust 
of the defense asserted by the public defender required 
that as little evidence as possible as to the appellant's 
intent be produced in order to raise a reasonable doubt in 
the minds of the jurors. 
Present counsel's complaint that the stipulation 
as to the Bank officer's testimony is ambiguous and not 
probative of appellant's intent is remarkably parallel 
to the complaint of the public defender on appeal (see 
-6-
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original Brief of Appellant, Points I and II). No credible 
claim of incompetence can be assigned on this point. 
Present counsel's claim that the check was not 
paid because of a stop-payment rather than an insuff icienoy 
of funds is not supported by the record (Tr,10), and 
irrelevant. Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-505 (Supp. 1975), silllpl.y 
requires that payment be refused by the drawee, and a stop.. 
payment is as effective in preyenting payment as an 
insufficiency of funds. Appellant has not demonstrated 
incompetence of counsel in this regard. 
Present counsel's complaint that the public 
defender did not discuss the consequences of a guilty 'ftllS'li~ 
with the appellant is simply irrelevant to the issue o£ 
whether a constitutionally adequate defense had been Ul8l1e 
by the public defender. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that appellant has not met 
his burden of demonstrating that the record affirmativel:;r 
shows that appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel. Respondent submits that appellant's effort, with 
the benefit of hindsight, to speculate as to what may 
have been a more effective defense is not a ground for 
-7-
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reversal. Appellant received the assistance of a capable 
member of the bar who presented a good faith legal defens 
and the judgment and sentence of the court below should 
therefore be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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